In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

M.A.T. No. 1072 of 2026
+
CAN 1 of 2026

Arising out of

W.P.A. No.12272 of 2026

Md. Idrish and Others

-Versus-

Union of India and others

For the appellants	:	Mr. Kaustav Banerjee, Ms. Ria Kunud, ... Advs.
For the Union of India	:	Mr. Uday Sankar Bhattacharya, Mr. Tirtha Pati Acharya, ... Advs.
For the respondents	:	Mr. Subhankar Nag, Mr. Ashok Kr. Jena, Mr. Sourav Ghosh, Mr. Snehashis Sen, Mr. Abhishek Banerjee, ... Advs.
Heard on	:	16.07.2026
Reserved on	:	16.07.2026
Judgment on	:	21.07.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appellants filed a writ petition, bearing W.P.A. No.12272 of 2026, challenging a demolition drive initiated by the Syama Prasad Mookherjee Port (SPMP), formerly known as the Calcutta Port Trust, in respect of the subject-buildings, alleging that the appellants are occupants of the said buildings. The said writ petition was dismissed on contest *vide* Judgment dated June 30, 2026, giving rise to the present appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge observed that the writ petitioners/appellants could not satisfy the writ court as to how they came into possession of the subject premises/quarters/dwelling units and that from a careful scrutiny of the Aadhaar Cards produced by the appellants, no materials could be found regarding their alleged occupation and/or possession and, accordingly, held that in the absence of any cogent evidence regarding 'unauthorised occupation' of the appellants in the aforementioned premises, owned by the respondent-Authorities, the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1971 Act") have got no manner of application. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

3. Learned counsel contends that all the writ petitioners/appellants *prima facie* proved their possession in respect of the subject-premises by production of different documents, including Aadhaar Cards, Voter's Identity Cards, and Gas Supply Bills, which were overlooked by the learned Single Judge. In view of such *prima facie* proof of occupation having been furnished, the Port Authorities acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to demolish the subject buildings without resorting to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act. Under the said provisions, the Port Authorities are duty-bound to first adjudicate as to whether the occupation the appellants is 'unauthorised' within the contemplation of the said Act and thereafter, upon giving opportunity to show cause and hearing the appellants, to pass appropriate orders.

4. Secondly, it is contended by the appellants that even if the demolition could be construed to be under Section 5-B of the 1971 Act, the Authorities were duty-bound to issue prior notice to each of the appellants and to give a reasonable opportunity to them to show cause as to why an order of demolition should not be made. Moreover, it is argued that the Port Authorities do not have any power under any statute to undertake such demolition drive.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants next takes the court through the provisions of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as "the Aadhaar Act"), and contends that issuance of an Aadhaar card is preceded by a verification as to "demographic information" furnished by the applicant.

6. Section 2(k) of the Aadhaar Act defines "demographic information", which also includes the address of the applicant as one of the necessary components of such information. As per Section 2(c) of the said Act, "authentication" means the process by which the Aadhaar number, along with demographic information or biometric information of an individual, is submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for its verification and such Repository verifies the correctness, or the lack thereof, on the basis of information available with it.

7. Section 3(3) of the said Act stipulates that on receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual.

8. The Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016 (for short, "the Regulations") provides for the modalities in such verification process. Schedule II to the Regulations includes various documents, on the basis of which the verification process is completed. Thus, only upon production of documentary proof of address, the Aadhaar Cards are issued. Hence, it is argued that learned Single Judge refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law in not considering the Aadhaar Cards produced by the appellants as sufficient proof of occupation. Even the other documents produced by the appellants, being in the nature of gas supply bills and Voter's Identity Cards, it is submitted, were sufficient to *prima facie* come to the conclusion that the appellants are in occupation of the subject-premises. However, the learned Single Judge overlooked the said documents altogether.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the Port Authorities contends that out of 52 writ petitioners/appellants, only 22 produced their Aadhaar Cards whereas the other 30 did not. Thus, the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that no proof of occupation was furnished by the appellants.

10. Learned counsel places reliance on Regulation 2(d) of the Regulations, which defines "authentication" to mean the process by which the Aadhaar number, along with demographic information or biometric information of an individual, is submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for its verification and such Repository verifies the correctness, or the lack thereof, on the basis of information available with it.

11. Regulation 7(1) thereof provides that the Registrars appointed by the Authority shall carry out the enrolment by themselves or through enrolling agencies contracted/appointed by them. Thus, it is such agencies which carry out the verification process and the Authority does not have any direct role to play therein. Learned counsel further argues that it will be evident from Regulations 10 and 11 that the process of verification is confined to ascertaining whether the information furnished by the applicant is correctly recorded and is based on documents furnished by the applicant, without any process of physical verification of the address being envisaged. Thus, the mere production of an Aadhaar Card cannot justify the conclusion that the applicant's address is the actual place of residence of the applicant as given by him/her before the Authority.

12. Learned counsel cites *Debashis Nandy Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP No.15233(W) of 2018]*, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this court, to argue that although an Aadhaar Card may be substantive proof of the identity of the individual, based on the biometric information taken from the applicant, it cannot be a conclusive proof of his/her identity or address.

13. Learned counsel further cites *Parvati Kumar and Others. Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin Secy Home and Others*, reported at *2019 SCC OnLine All 7085*, where a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that in case a person relies on entries in Aadhaar Card with regard to address, under the Evidence Act, it cannot be said that the entries in that regard are conclusive proof of such fact.

14. It was observed by the Division Bench that the Regulations provide for the applicant to rely on a set of documents for giving information in regard to name, address and proof of date of birth; however, because the said information is merely given by the applicant, and is not authenticated by UIDAI at the time of authentication, the Aadhaar Card cannot be conclusive proof in regard to those entries.

15. Lastly, learned counsel cites *Association For Democratic Reforms and Others v. Election Commission of India and Others*, reported at *2026 SCC OnLine SC 990*, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that insofar as Aadhaar Card is concerned, reliance was placed on Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, which does not recognize it as a proof of citizenship or domicile, thereby rendering it unsuitable for the purpose of electoral verification. The statutory framework governing the Aadhaar Card, it was observed, does not treat is as a proof of citizenship or domicile. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe that Section 23(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 expressly contemplates the use of Aadhaar for the limited purpose of establishing the identity of an individual but such recognition does not elevate Aadhaar to conclusive proof, and that the authorities would remain empowered to verify its authenticity and genuineness, including by calling for such further material as may be necessary in a given case.

16. On the strength of the above judgments, it is argued that the reliance of the appellants on their Aadhaar Cards and other documents does not entitle them to a finding that they are in occupation of the subject-properties.

17. Learned counsel for the Port Authorities next submits that from the photographs and correspondence produced before the writ court by way of a report, it would be evident that the subject-buildings are in a dangerous and dilapidated condition and may cave in at any point of time, thus endangering public safety. As such, the said properties are required to be immediately demolished.

18. Learned counsel further argues that to be in 'unauthorised occupation' within the contemplation of the 1971 Act, such occupation has to be 'settled occupation' and any and every intruder or passer-by cannot claim to be in occupation for the purpose of the 1971 Act.

19. With regard to the Second Schedule of the Regulations, it is argued that the verification process and the documents to be furnished are unilaterally produced by the applicant, upon which the Aadhaar Cards are issued. Thus, in the absence of any physical verification of the actual residence of the applicant at the address given by him/her, Aadhaar Cards or other similar documents cannot be taken to be substantial proof of occupation.

20. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

21. On the basis of the arguments of counsel and the materials on record, this court comes to the following conclusions:

<u>Proof of occupation</u>

22. The writ petition was dismissed primarily on the ground of absence of any proof as to the appellants' occupation in respect of the subject-premises. Out of the 52 appellants, some have produced their Aadhaar Cards and others, documents such as Gas Supply Bills, Voter's Identity Cards, etc.

23. Learned counsel for the Port Authorities argues that "occupation", for the purpose of the 1971 Act, ought to be "settled occupation".

24. In respect of certain statutes such as the Electricity Act, 2003, courts have held that in order to get an electricity connection, the appellant must be in settled occupation of the property where such connection is sought, lending an element of permanence or intention to reside to the quality of such occupation.

25. However, there is no such qualification enumerated in the 1971 Act or the body of judgments rendered thereon. Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act defines "unauthorised occupation" to mean the occupation by any person of public premises without authority for such occupation, and include the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (by way of grant or any other mode of transfer), under which he was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. Such inclusive definition contemplates both cases - where there was a prior grant which has since expired/ been determined and rank trespassers whose occupation is not preceded by any such grant. In respect of both, however, the trappings of the 1971 Act apply. Accordingly, the observation of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners/appellants could not satisfy the Court as to how they "came into possession" of the subject-premises under the respondent-Authorities, could not be a determinant of the applicability of the 1971 Act.

26. The next question which arises is whether Aadhaar Cards and the other documents produced by the appellants were sufficient to come to a *prima facie* conclusion of their occupation.

27. It is to be kept in mind that the writ court is not a fact-finding forum or a competent authority to adjudicate upon such question conclusively. In order to invoke the 1971 Act and its provisions, the writ petitioners/appellants were merely to furnish *prima facie* proof of their occupation. The term "occupation" is not separately defined in the 1971 Act but is a component of "unauthorised occupation" as defined in Section 2(g) thereof. Such "occupation" is qualified in the said provision merely by the expression "without authority for such occupation", without any element of permanence in it.

28. In *Debashis Nandy (supra)*[1], the learned Single Judge of this Court was considering the question of sanctity of an Aadhaar Card as a source of individual identification, as reflected in Paragraph No. 21 of the said report. In such context, it was held that Aadhaar is not the *only* means of

[1] *Debashis Nandy Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP No.15233(W) of 2018]*

identification and the question of identification of a person based on which a civil dispute would be decided, does not solely rests with his/her Aadhaar identification. Thus, in the context of a civil dispute, the Aadhaar Card would not be the sole test of an individual's identification. There is a gulf of difference between a civil suit and a proceeding under the 1971 Act and/or for that matter, a writ petition. Proof before a civil court, which conclusively determines the rights of parties, has to be of a much higher standard than before a writ court or an authority under the 1971 Act. Even otherwise, the observation of the learned Single Judge in the cited decision was only to the effect that an Aadhaar Card cannot be a *sole* proof of identification, thus implicitly recognizing that it could be one of the circumstantial proofs thereof.

29. The learned Single Judge ultimately came to the conclusion, as did the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in *Parvati Kumar (supra)*[2], that an Aadhaar Card is not a conclusive proof of the 'demographic information' (including address) of an applicant.

30. In *Association For Democratic Reforms (supra)*[3] (commonly referred to as the "SIR Case"), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the procedure and methodology adopted in carrying out the exercise by the Election Commission, including the method prescribed by the Commission to ascertain the citizenship of the voters. In such specific context, the Hon'ble

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[2] ***Parvati Kumar and Others. Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin Secy Home and Others, reported at 2019 SCC OnLine All 7085***

[3] ***Association For Democratic Reforms and Others v. Election Commission of India and Others*, reported at *2026 SCC OnLine SC 990***

Supreme Court observed that insofar as the documentation regime was concerned, the initial grievance of the petitioners centred around the exclusion of widely held Aadhaar Cards, which was directly addressed by the Court while directing the inclusion of the Aadhaar Card with a clarification regarding the statutory status of Aadhaar as a valid document for establishing identity. In such backdrop, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the statutory framework governing the Aadhaar Card does not treat it as proof of citizenship or domicile. It was also held that the recognition of Aadhaar Card as an additional document of identity for consideration in the process of inclusion in the voters' list does not elevate Aadhaar to conclusive proof and the authorities would remain empowered to verify its authenticity and genuineness, including by calling for further material as may be necessary.

31. It is to be noted that the paradigm of citizenship or domicile is somewhat different from the residence of a person at a particular address. "Citizenship" has a far wider connotation than the mere residence of a person at a particular address. "Domicile" indicates the place or country of ordinary residence of an individual, which is legally recognized or officially recognized. Hence, in order to prove domicile or citizenship, many additional ingredients, apart from mere occupation of a particular property, including an element of permanence, are to be established. Thus, the proposition of law that Aadhaar Card is not a proof of citizenship or domicile, does not invalidate it, *per se*, as a proof of mere occupation of a premises. As held earlier, no permanence is attached to the definition of 'unauthorised occupation' in the 1971 Act.

32. All the above judgments merely come to the conclusion that an Aadhaar Card is not a "conclusive" proof, either of address or identity and/or domicile. However, "conclusive" and "*prima facie*" are diametrically opposite concepts. Whereas the former has a sense of finality, the latter is merely a preliminary assessment. Even if an Aadhaar Card is not *conclusive* proof of residence, it is definitely a *prima facie* proof of occupation in respect of a property.

33. Section 2(k) of the Aadhaar Act defines "demographic information" to include address. Section 3(3) thereof stipulates that on receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall verify the same and only then issue an Aadhaar number.

34. Regulation 7 of the Regulations, contrary to the argument of the Port Authorities, envisages that the Registrars appointed by the Authorities are to carry out the enrolment of individuals, either by themselves or through enrolling agencies appointed by them. In either case, the responsibility of carrying out such process ultimately lies with the Registrars and not their agents.

35. Again, Regulation 11 is not restricted to collection of information but, under sub-regulation (2)(b) thereof, confers on the individual seeking to enrol an opportunity to check the accuracy of the information captured. The list of documents that may be presented as proof of address for applicants of age 5 years and above, as given in Schedule II of the Regulations, names several substantive documents, including Valid Indian Passport, Ration/PDS Photograph Card/e-Ration Card, Voter Identity Card/e-Voter Identity Card, Disability Identity Card, Photograph Identity Card, Scheduled Tribe/Scheduled Caste/Other Backward Caste documents, Passbook with photograph issued by a Public Sector Bank, Certificate issued by MP/MLA/MLC/Municipal councillor or a Gazetted Officer, including Tehsildar and other authorities, Electricity Bill, Water Bill, Telephone Landline bill, Valid Sale Agreement, Gas Connection Bill, Allotment Letter of accommodation, Life or Medical Insurance Policy, valid Long Term Visa, valid Registration Certificate or Residential Permit issued by the FRRO, etc.

36. Thus, multiple categories of documents are recognized in the list given in Schedule II as valid proof to verify the address of an applicant for the purpose of issuance of Aadhaar Card. Notably, Gas Bills and Voter Identity Cards, which are the documents produced by the appellants other than Aadhaar Cards, are also documents recognized under Schedule-II as valid documents for issuance of Aadhaar Cards.

37. The Legislature, in its wisdom, recognized all such categories of documents as *prima facie* proof of address. Hence, it is not for the writ court to defy such Legislative intent by brushing aside the said documents even for the purpose of *prima facie* establishing the address of a person.

38. At the threshold stage, for undertaking any proceeding under the 1971 Act, mere *prima facie* address proof is sufficient to set the ball rolling under the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act.

39. Thus, in the present case, the writ petitioners/appellants have produced sufficient documents to *prima facie* establish their occupation of the subject buildings for the purpose of being entitled to come within the purview of "unauthorised occupants" under the 1971 Act.

Scope of adjudication under the 1971 Act

40. There are two stages of scrutiny envisaged for eviction of a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under the 1971 Act. Under Section 4(1) thereof, if the Estate Officer has information and/or knows or has reasons to believe that any person is in unauthorised occupation of a public premises, he is to forthwith issue a notice in writing calling upon such person to show cause why an eviction order should not be made. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 stipulates several ingredients of such notice, including the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and notice requiring all persons concerned, who may be in occupation or even claim interest in the public premises, to show cause and to appear before the Estate Officer along with evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, if any, and also for personal hearing, if desired.

41. Thus, not only occupants but also persons merely claiming interest in the public premises are brought within the fold of a show cause notice under Section 4 of the 1971 Act, coupled with the rights to disclose the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown and to seek personal hearing.

42. At the second level, Section 5(1) stipulates that only if, upon considering the cause shown and any evidence produced by the noticee in support of the cause and after personal hearing, if any, the Estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, he shall make an order of eviction, that too for reasons to be recorded.

43. Thus, it may very well be that upon the cause shown and the evidence produced pursuant to a Section 4(1) notice, the Estate Officer is satisfied and comes to the conclusion that the concerned person is not in unauthorised occupation and drop the proceeding then and there. In such a case, no question would arise at all to initiate an eviction proceeding.

44. The second stage involves an order being passed for eviction after giving full opportunity of hearing and of production of evidence to the alleged unauthorised occupant, whereafter an order is to be made granting 15 days to such occupant to vacate the premises and only thereafter, to take possession of the premises. Under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the 1971 Act, if the Estate Officer is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that there exists any compelling reason which prevents the person from vacating the premises within 15 days, another 15 days may be granted by the Estate Officer for the person to vacate the premises.

45. Thus, several layers of protection have been given to an unauthorised occupant under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act. It is to be noted that the satisfaction to be recorded under Section 5(1) by the Estate Officer, upon perusing the cause shown and considering the evidence as well as hearing the noticee, also includes a consideration as to whether the person is in occupation of the premises, since “occupation” is an inextricable ingredient of “unauthorised occupation”.

46. As to the provisions of Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C of the 1971 Act, those are not attracted at all in the instant case. All the said three Sections pertain to “unauthorised construction”, that is, any building or any movable or immovable structure or fixture erected or placed or raised on or against or in front of any public premises except in accordance with the authority under which the occupant was allowed to occupy such premises. It is nobody’s case here that any such unauthorised construction has been raised, displayed or spread, or any cattle or other animal has been brought to be kept, on any public premises, to come within the purview of “unauthorised construction” under the said Sections.

47. “Unauthorised construction”, for the purpose of Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C, and “unauthorised occupation” under Section 2(g), for the purpose of invoking Sections 4 and 5, stand on entirely different footings.

48. Thus, Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C are not applicable, but Sections 4 and 5 are clearly attracted in the present case, in view of the appellants having furnished *prima facie* material to show their occupation in respect of the subject-premises, even if such proof is not ‘conclusive’.

49. Hence, the provisions of the 1971 Act are squarely attracted. Since the Port Authorities have failed to invoke the same and/or issue any notice contemplated under Section 4 thereof and/or to record *prima facie* satisfaction upon hearing the appellants as to their occupation being unauthorised, the attempts at demolition of the premises, in the process evicting the appellants, is palpably illegal and *de hors* the law.

Power of demolition

50. The power of demolition vested in the authorities under the 1971 Act is restricted to "unauthorised constructions" and not "authorised constructions which are occupied by unauthorised occupants", as in the present case. The subject-properties admittedly belong to the Port Authorities and are not unauthorised constructions erected by the appellants. Thus, the procedure envisaged under Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C is not attracted in the present case at all.

51. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act do not empower the Authorities to demolish the properties but merely to evict unauthorised occupants therefrom.

52. The ground of dilapidation of the premises and/or their allegedly precarious condition is unknown as a ground of demolition or eviction by the Authorities under the 1971 Act. Such ground, even if available under the municipal statutes to the authorities so empowered under such statutes, cannot be invoked or exercised by the Government or Government Instrumentalities owning public premises within the contemplation of the 1971 Act. If at all, it is the municipal authorities who could have initiated a demolition process in adherence to the respective governing statutes, upon issuance of prior notice as contemplated therein, prior to demolishing the precarious or dangerous buildings. In any event, the Port Authorities in the present case are not an authority under any such statute, and/or the 1971 Act, empowered to demolish their own structures on the ground of dilapidation or dangerous condition. Thus, the impugned action of demolition undertaken by the Port Authorities cannot also be accepted.

<u>Admission by the Port</u>

53. From the correspondence relied on by the Port Authorities themselves, the argument of the said Authorities, that the subject-buildings are vacant and abandoned premises, is belied. In the report filed before the writ court, the Port Authorities admitted that the subject-quarters are residential apartments. Furthermore, in the letter dated May 22, 2025 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Port Division, Kolkata to the Chairman of the Kolkata Port Trust, it is admitted that the subject-properties comprised of 502 residential quarters. Again, the request to the Port Authorities and the KMC Authorities to take urgent steps, authored by the Officer-in-Charge of the West Port Police Station, dated May 21, 2025, reiterates that the premises consist of 502 residential quarters, occupied by 8,000 residents.

54. Not a single notice to any of such residents has been produced by the Port Authorities, within the contemplation of the 1971 Act.

55. Although the Port Authorities claim that a general notice was pasted in a public place near the premises, no proof in that regard has been furnished either in the report filed before the writ court and/or before this Court. Thus, the so-called demolition drive initiated by the SPMP (Port) is palpably unlawful, *de hors* the law and violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as no opportunity has been given to the appellants to show cause or be heard or to produce evidence in support of their stance regarding the said premises.

56. The appellants rely on *Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Arya & Ors.*, reported at *2009 SCC OnLine Cal 266*, which is germane in the context. It was held therein that though an Estate Officer under the 1971 Act is not required to be versed in law, he had sufficient powers to decide the question as to whether a noticee under Section 4 of the said Act is an unauthorised occupant and it is the adjudication on such score against the noticee that will permit him to evict the occupant adjudged to be authorised. Such prior adjudication as to whether a person is in 'unauthorised occupation' also includes the ingredient of whether a person, who has *prima facie* shown that he/she is in possession, is actually in physical occupation of the premises.

57. In the present case, in the absence of any such exercise being conducted by the Port, in the teeth of the admission of the Port as indicated above, the entire exercise of attempted demolition is palpably unlawful.

CONCLUSION

58. In view of the above discussions, the demolition drive sought to be carried out by the respondent-Authorities is held to be unlawful and ought to be halted. Thus, the learned Single Judge erred in law and proceeded on an erroneous premise in dismissing the writ petition.

59. Accordingly, M.A.T. No.1072 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby restraining the respondent-Authorities from undertaking any demolition process and/or eviction drive in respect of the residential quarters, dwelling units and structures named as Calcutta Dock Labour Board (CDLB) Quarters and Calcutta Port Trust (CPT) Quarters, located at Brooke Lane, Garden Reach, Kolkata.

60. Accordingly, W.P.A. No.12272 of 2026 stands allowed to the above extent.

61. However, nothing in this judgment shall preclude the respondent-Authorities from initiating due proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act insofar as the subject-properties are concerned.

62. CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of.

63. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

64. There will be no order as to costs.

65. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)