

**IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE**

BEFORE:

THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

WPA 27880 of 2025

Jaya Shree Textiles

Vs.

Prabhu Nath Yadav & Anr.

For the Petitioner

:Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dwaipayan Sengupta, Adv.
Ms. Sanjukta Dutta, Adv.
Mr. Balaram Patra, Adv.
Mr. Suvadip Bhattacharya, Adv.

For the Respondent No. 1

:Mr. Asim Datta, Adv.
Ms. Tina Biswas, Adv.

Judgment reserved on

: 15.09.2026

Judgment delivered on

: 08.10.2026

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:-

1. The present writ application has been preferred challenging an award dated 19th September, 2025 passed by the learned 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. 01 of 2016 under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and published by the State Government on 09.10.2025.
2. The petitioner's case is that the said award has been passed on remand as directed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 10th March, 2025, **restricting the scope of remand to reappraisal of evidence on the materials already available on record.**

3. The charge against the respondent workman (security guard-jamadar at the factory) was of theft of cables coupled with loss of confidence and acts subversive of discipline.
4. The charge sheet is dated 27th November, 2014. The said charge sheet was amended with reference to typographical errors before commencement of regular hearing at the enquiry proceeding, on 7th May, 2015. Apart from the departmental enquiry, a criminal proceeding is continuing and there has been a seizure of the goods recovered from the possession of the respondent – workman.
5. One important aspect in the entire gamut of evidence at the domestic enquiry was that although the workman had made various statements and taken different stand as regards the location of his family at various railway stations before the alleged boarding of the train to native place, the workman had only stated that he was in the rail premises (Rishra) at around 10 am. He has suppressed his travel at any other railway station during the entire occurrence of event.
6. It is the case of the petitioner that if the workman was to travel to Uttar Pradesh on the day of incident, he would normally and reasonably travel to the railway station along with his family members. The workman's allotted quarter was at Rishra, whereas his family allegedly stayed at Bandel. The stolen cables were recovered from the workman's possession near Serampore railway station, the very fact that the

workman never disclosed his location after 10.30 a.m. is sufficient to treat him as an untrustworthy witness.

7. It is further argued that if the workman had booked a railway ticket at 11.55 hours from Barrackpore railway station, under no circumstance could he support the factual position as to why his family would be at Bandel railway station at 12.20 p.m.
8. Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that in an allegation of theft, there would hardly be any eyewitness. The allegation is to be proved mainly on the basis of circumstantial evidence and trustworthiness of witnesses.
9. It is stated that the learned tribunal, while adjudicating an industrial dispute and deciding the allegation of theft vis-à-vis lack of confidence, is not to follow the strict rules of evidence or conduct a criminal trial to test the veracity of the charge by applying the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is submitted that the scope of interference of an industrial tribunal to reappraise evidence should be like that of judicial review, and not an appellate jurisdiction. By laying much stress on investigation by the police, the learned tribunal completely erred in law and returned a perverse conclusion.
10. Mr. Majumder relies upon the judgment in ***State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 (Para 7)*** and ***Sankha Dutta vs. The Union of India & Ors. [WPA 105556 of 2028]***.

- 11.** Parties have filed written notes in the present case. The respondent no.1/workman on filing written notes has argued that the petitioner is a company carrying on business of manufacturing textile and textile products. The respondent no. 1/workman is an employee under the petitioner in the post of "Jamadar" under the **category of Security Guard.**
- 12.** It is stated that the petitioner company had purchased certain quantity of cables, which were kept in the Administrative building of the factory on and from 4th September 2014. On 30th October, 2014 the workman applied for leave from 10th November, 2014 to 30th November, 2014 for visiting his native place at 'Rasra', Uttar Pradesh and such leave was sanctioned on 31.10.2014 by the company through its Administrative Manager, Mr. Rakesh Pandey, Management witness no.2 (MW-2) herein. On 3rd November, 2014 the said cables were reported to be missing. On 27th November, 2014 the petitioner company issued a Charge Sheet (Exbt. 11) to the workman whereby it was stated inter-alia, as follows:-

".... It has been reported against you that on 10.11.2014 at about 2.15 P.M. you were caught red handed in Sreerampur area by our Administrative Manager, Shri Rakesh Pandey and one of our Security guard Shri Kajal Dutta with a make shift gunny bag in your possession. On enquiry the stolen electrical cable weighing about 80 kgs belonging to the company was found inside the said gunny bag. You were taken to the Sreerampur Police Station along with the said electrical cable recovered from your possession. Somehow, you made yourself free and fled away. Incidentally, the

said electrical cable was missing from the factory since 03.10.2014 and could not be traced out anywhere.

A FIR was lodged with the Serampore Police Station and as report received, you were arrested by the Police personnel of Serampore Police Station. The stolen material was also seized and taken by the police personnel in their custody.

The aforesaid act of theft of the company's property on your part is major misconduct. Your such act of theft cast an adverse effect upon the discipline of the company. You are, therefore, charged with the following charges :-

- a) Theft and dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or Property.*
- b) Loss of confidence*
- c) Acts subversive of discipline.....”*

- 13.** The workman in his reply to the said Charge Sheet on 06.12.2014 denied all allegations contained therein in particular, the allegations of theft of the cables and subsequent recovery of the same from the custody of workman. The workman contended he took leave from his duty on 10th November, 2014 to visit his native village 'Rasra' Uttar Pradesh. Pursuant thereto on 10th November, 2014 the workman, his wife and son went to Bandel Station to avail the Azamgarh Express. The workman went to the Ticket Counter to purchase return ticket for his son, who came to see them off, leaving his wife and son waiting at the platform.
- 14.** At that point of time suddenly two unknown persons came to the place wherein his wife the son were sitting and kept a gunny bag under sealed cover near the luggage of the workman and they told that it

belong to the workman and thereafter they left the place. Immediately thereafter some staff of GRP/RPF attacked the workman's wife and son allegedly stating inter-alia, that the workman had stolen out article in the bag and they also took away them before the GRP office at Bandel Station wherefrom the workman was intimated by his son not to come to the Station. Subsequently without lodging any case the wife and son of the workman had been released and they came back to the quarter. Later, the workman came back to the quarter and the Police personnel arrested the workman from the quarter at night on 10th November, 2014.

- 15.** The workman further pointed out since the cables were stolen from factory on 3rd October, 2014 then why the matter was not referred to the local Police Station or the workman was not asked about such missing from 3rd October, 2014 to 9th November, 2014 ie more than one month ? Besides, why the gate keeper did not catch him at the gate? He also pointed out whether it is possible to carry 80 kg of cables in a gunny bag? Moreso, he complained about the integrity of Kajal Dutta who was earlier suspended for more than one month for theft in the factory. The workman therefore, submitted that he had been falsely implicated in a criminal case with concocted story.
- 16.** It is stated that the company did not consider the submission of the workman and on conducting the enquiry dismissed the respondent no.1 from his service by a letter dated 15th June, 2016. Hence the

proceeding before the tribunal to pass the order impugned in the present case. The respondent herein has denied the contention of the petitioner and stated that the tribunal rightly passed the impugned order relied upon the evidence on record and the tribunal rightly took into consideration the non-functioning of the CCTV.

17. In **Airports Authority of India vs Pradip Kumar Banerjee, in Civil Appeal No(s). 8414 of 2017, decided on February 04, 2025**, the Supreme Court held:-

*“32. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court in **Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806**, wherein it was held:-*

“11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. . . .”

33. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was

done by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the respondent.

39. *In the wake of the above discussion, we hold that the Division Bench, while exercising the intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering with the **concurrent findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority** as affirmed by the learned Single Judge.”*

18. The Supreme Court in the **State of Rajasthan and others – vs – Heem Singh, in Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020 decided on 29th October, 2020** held :-

“33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to

consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in **allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum.** Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. **To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity.** But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain."

19. In **B. C. Chaturvedi – vs – Union of Indian and others [(1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 749 in Civil Appeal No. 9830 of 1995]**, the Supreme Court held that :-

"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to

reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in *Shivdeo Singh* case that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every Court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of Course, this power is not as wide as which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter.

24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of a dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted, and, in view of the interdependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as *Bank Nationalisation* case, which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in *Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P.* also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it.”

- 20. In Civil Appeal No. 5848 of 2021 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Dalbir Singh) the Supreme Court held (relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein):-**

“25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”.

It was held as under:-

“11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of

probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside."

(Emphasis Supplied)

26. This Court in **Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 385**, held that the criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, whereas, the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It was held as under:

"11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [(2004) 2 SCC 130] .] The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalyaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [(2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry [(2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal [(2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341] .

"8. ... The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offense for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any

guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in the criminal cases against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offense generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short 'the Evidence Act']. The converse is the case of departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. ... Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances."

27. This Court in *Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors.*, (1997) 2 SCC 699, held that in the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under:

"7. ...There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are

entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed.” (Emphasis Supplied)

28. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, 9 (1997) 2 SCC 699 the appellants were given opportunity to produce the registers of the entrustment of S.L.R. to the writ petitioner. But it was stated that record was not available being an old record as the incident was of 1993. The enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the acquittal of the writ petitioner from the criminal trial. Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence of registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon stands proven on the basis of oral testimony of the departmental witnesses. 29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a false case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being immobilized and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is

not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. he best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.”

21. A writ Court has the jurisdiction in such proceedings to only ensure that the person aggrieved has had a fair trial and that principle of natural justice was followed while deciding the case and as to whether the punishment given is in proportionate to the offence committed. A writ Court cannot go into the details of evidence recorded and as to the discrepancies of the said finding and proceedings conducted by a disciplinary authority.

22. In the present case the order of the disciplinary authority is based on the materials on record. No perversity is seen in the said order and the principle of natural justice has been followed.

23. The Division Bench in FMA 54 of 2025 directed as follows:-

“18. In the above circumstances, this Court directs that the Tribunal shall after giving a fair and appropriate and comprehensive opportunity to the workman’s representative and that of the Management to reappreciate the entire evidence that is available on the record of the Enquiry Officer. Such re-appreciation shall be independent, impartial and fair. In the process of such re-appreciation, the Tribunal shall also be entitled to and the parties shall, if necessary, address the Tribunal on the quantum of punishment, if at all, to be imposed on the workmen.”

24. While doing so, the Bench observed as follows:-

“14. In the instant case, this Court sees that the workmen had in extensio cross-examined the Management witnesses. He had also re-examined himself. The tenor of

cross-examination scrutinized by this Court invariably indicates, an experienced and seasoned hand in defending domestic enquiries against the workmen and the employees.

15. This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the Interim Award and the findings of the learned Single Bench in review that the workmen was seriously prejudiced in being denied the services of a Lawyer in the domestic enquiry.”

25. The tribunal then vide the impugned award dated 19.09.2025 has passed an elaborate order and his **re appreciation of evidence appears to even more extensively scrutinized than that in a sessions trial**, even though the enquiry proceedings in this case was extensive, thorough, and following the principles of natural justice.
26. Admittedly the employee herein was in the **security department** and was well aware of the safety and security measures in and around the factory premises.
27. **Though the tribunal has put his own interpretation by considering the evidence on record, regarding the functioning of the CCTV, there appears to be one question which remains unanswered, that is as to why the employee was in the factory premise at 10.30 a.m. on the date when his leave had already commenced and when his train was scheduled to leave within a short time thereafter.**
28. The stolen goods were recovered from the possession of his family members, who were waiting to board a train and the employee has also stated in his evidence that the said goods were brought in a Tata Sumo as informed to him by his family members, which proves that the stolen

goods were put in the Tata Sumo in presence of the employee's family members. On careful scrutiny of the entire enquiry proceeding and the report there after it appears that principles of natural justice was strictly following giving sufficient opportunity to the delinquent employee.

29. The said fact is supported by observations in the order of the Division Bench also.
30. **The award of the tribunal is a clearly perverse having travelled beyond the scope of interference permitted in the findings of a domestic enquiry.**
31. Thus the award dated 19th September, 2025 passed by the learned 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. 01 of 2016 under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, **is set aside.**
32. **WPA 27880 of 2025 is allowed.**
33. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
34. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)